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Abstract 
 
Abstract: Gender stereotypes can influence different investors’ perceptions and expec-
tations between male and female led firms. Using institutional ownership data for U.S. 
S&P 500 companies from 2001 to 2017, we examine how CEO gender affects institu-
tional investment decisions. We find that passive (as opposed to active) institutions in-
vest greater proportions of their portfolios in firms with male CEOs compared to those 
with female CEOs. One explanation for this result is the stereotype that leadership skill 
is perceived to be a masculine trait. On the other hand, we find no evidence that the 
fraction of female board members affects the portfolio weights, so the result applies 
strictly to female leadership, and not to female representation. We also find that passive 
institutions run by female CEOs tend to invest smaller proportions of their portfolios in 
each firm, so institutions with female CEOs tend to diversify more than those with male 
CEOs. This finding suggests that female CEOs of financial institutions are more finan-
cially risk-averse than male CEOs. These results imply that gender is an important fac-
tor that affects passive institution investment choices, and they illustrate a systematic 
bias against investing in female led firms. 
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1. Introduction  
Male CEOs remain the norm in the business world. The number of female CEOs in the 
Fortune 500 remained 24 in May 2018, after it reached its historic high in 2014. In 
other words, only 4.8% of the Fortune 500 firms have female CEOs.1 However, under 
public pressure, many firms have to increase gender diversity on their boards. Moreover, 
a number of European countries have passed legislation mandating more female board 
representation for publicly traded firms. Increasing female board representation could 
be the first step to have more female CEOs in the business world.  
According to the Higgs report (Higgs, 2003), increasing gender diversity could boost 
board effectiveness. In Sweden, it is legally required that at least 25% of the board 
members are women (Medland, 2004). Similarly, Norway carried out the most extreme 
promotion of gender diversity. In 2006, it was legislated that all listed companies must 
comply with a 40% gender quota for women on board, and firms were given two years 
to adjust. Spain also followed Norway’s step by making legislation requiring companies 
to have 40% female directors by 2015. In Figure 1.1, we can see the percentage of 
female presidents, board members and employee representatives increased dramatically 
from 2003 to 2019 in the EU, with the highest record around 28% in 2019.Figure 1.2 
shows the percentage of female CEOs, executives and non-executives in the EU. Alt-
hough the percentage kept increasing from 2012, the percentage is still relatively low: 
about 17.8% listed firms have female CEOs, executives and non-executives.  
  
 
1 https://fortune.com/2017/06/07/fortune-500-women-ceos/ 
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Figure 1.1 The change in percentage of female presidents, board members and employee represent-
atives from listed companies in EU 28 countries 
 
Figure 1.2 The change in percentage of female CEOs, executives and non-executives from listed 
companies in EU 28 countries 
 
Following European countries’ step, the trend of accelerating gender diversity on 
boards has expanded to the U.S. For Russell 3000 listing companies, 45% of new di-
rectors are women in 2019. That percentage in 2018 was 34%. However, similar change 
is not seen with female CEOs. In Figure 1.3 we see that although women take 21.2% 
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of the board seats in S&P 500 companies in 2019, only 5.4% of companies have female 
CEOs.2 Female CEOs are rare to the investors, so those involved in the market become 
interested in the impact the female CEOs will have on the firms. 
Figure 1.3 Pyramid: Women in S&P 500 Companies 
 
Previous studies suggest that top managers’ characteristics influence firms’ policies 
such as finance and investment. (Cain & Mckeon, 2016; Cronqvist et al., 2010). To test 
if women are associated with risk-averse characteristic in the finance industry, research 
show that women are more conservative investors compared to men (Carter et al., 2003; 
Charness & Gneezy, 2012; Bernasek & Shiwff, 2001). It is worth understanding how 
women’s risk-averse characteristic influences investors’ view on top female managers, 
considering the representation of women on boards is increasing. Institutional investors 
are major players in the U.S. market. Institutional ownership of the market started grow-
ing up roughly 50 years ago. In the 1990s, institutional investors were estimated to own 
45% of all outstanding equity. This number was 33% in the 1980s and only 8% in 1950. 
According to Bloomberg, institutional investors owned 80.3% of the S&P 500 index 
 
2 Catalyst, Pyramid: Women in S&P 500 Companies (September 1, 2019). 
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and 80.2% of the S&P 1500 composite index in 2017. Thus, our focus is on how CEO 
gender affects institutional investors’ investment decisions.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) find that large shareholders have an incentive to monitor 
managers because of their significant economic stakes, so institutional investors 
changed from just passive investors to active monitors. To enhance managerial account-
ability, institutions could change the composition of investee firms’ boards. In 2017, 
State Street Global Advisor, which is the world’s third-largest asset manager, began 
pressuring companies on gender diversity at the board level. This asset management 
firm carried out the board diversity program. It asked firms to meet its gender diversity 
criteria, or State Street would vote against the entire slate of board members on the 
nominating committee.3 
Institutional investors already started influencing the female representation in investee 
firms’ board rooms. Chen et al. (2007) investigate institutions that practiced monitoring 
and categorize institutional investors into two types: “grey” institutional investors and 
independent investors. Since these two types of institutions have different incentives to 
monitor investee firms, we would like to know whether and how gender impact their 
investments. 
Previous studies show that gender did influence independent institutional investors’ de-
cisions. Francis et al. (2017) carry out a study that focused on activist hedge funds, 
which is a type of an independent institutional investor. They believe hedge funds prefer 
investee firms with female CEOs because of the differences in managerial and leader-
ship styles between female and male CEOs. Although we know what independent in-
stitutional investors want, we still do not know “grey” institutional investors’ preference. 
Therefore, the research gap exists. We would like to address the gender preference of 
“grey” institutional investors.  
In this paper, we study 25,038 passive institutional ownership data of U.S. S&P 500 
 
3 https://www.institutionalinvestor.com 
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companies from 2001 to 2017.4 The portfolio weight is used to measure institutional 
investors’ willingness to invest in different firms, and we create gender dummy varia-
bles for both investee firms and institutional investors as our key explanatory variables. 
We obtain the institutional holding data from the Thomson Reuters 13F database, and 
the CEOs’ genders are gathered from BoardEx. Following previous studies, we control 
for the investee firms’ and CEO’s characteristics. Based on our sample, we find that 
passive institutions invest greater proportions of their portfolios in firms with male 
CEOs compared to those with female CEOs. 
Our result shows that institutions run by female CEOs are likely to invest smaller pro-
portions of their portfolios to each firm, which is consistent with the stereotype that 
women are risk averse. Also, we test whether passive institutions would take the inves-
tee firms’ gender diversity on board into account when they make investment decisions. 
Our result shows that gender diversity on board is not as important as the CEO gender 
for passive institutions. By dividing our date into two periods, pre-2008 and past-2008, 
we run the regression separately. Comparing the regression results from these two pe-
riods, we notice passive institutions are becoming less discriminating against the female 
CEOs. 
Our research makes the following contributions to the literature. Firstly, based on our 
research, we are the first to investigate how gender impacts passive institution invest-
ment decisions. Thus, this paper would enrich the understanding of institutional inves-
tors, especially for passive institutions. Our results show that passive institutions have 
different gender preferences compared to the independent institutional investors, which 
also supports the category of institutional investors established by previous literature. 
Secondly, several world’s largest investment institutions carried out a campaign to im-
prove the female representation on board since 2017. With their new guidelines applied 
to different regions around the world, our findings would help institutions to know the 
varying needs of different types of institutional investors. Thirdly, this paper focuses on 
 
4 We follow the category of institutional investors done by Chen et al. (2007) and define the passive institutional 
investors as the “grey” institutional investors in their research. 
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the U.S. market. After the legislation of female board seat representative in California, 
other states will carry out similar regulations or laws modelling California’s law. This 
paper could provide investors with a deeper understanding of female CEOs as well as 
support the new regulations with a theoretical background. Finally, our results confirm 
that female CEOs are more risk-averse compared to their male peers. Therefore, we add 
additional evidence to the research of female CEOs. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In Section 2, we summarize previ-
ous works of literature and developed our hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe the 
variables construction and regression model. Section 4 presents our main regression 
results and robustness test. The conclusion is in Section 5. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 The effect of managers on firm policies 
Some researchers are interested in whether and how individual managers affect corpo-
rate behavior and performance. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) construct a manager-firm 
matched panel dataset to track the top managers across different firms over time. There 
is evidence that manager fixed effects matter for a wide range of corporate decisions. 
They conclude that management style is significantly related to managers’ fixed effects 
in performance. 
As for risk preference, researchers believe that CEOs’ risk-taking has an influence on 
the firms’ decisions. Cronqvist et al. (2010) use a database of CEO’s leverage in their 
most recent home purchases to find a positive relationship between personal home lev-
erage and corporate leverage in the cross-section when examining CEO turnover. This 
paper empirically supports that CEO’s behavioral consistency across personal and pro-
fessional situations can predict the corporate financial behavior of the firms they man-
age. In another paper, using a sample of 15,627 firm-years between 1992 and 2009, 
1016 of which were led by CEOs who are also recreational pilots, Cain and Mckeon 
(2016) test for differences in corporate policies, for instance, leverage, acquisitiveness, 
and related policy choices to overall firm risk. They analyze the relation between CEO 
personal risk-taking, corporate risk-taking and total firm risk. The researchers demon-
strate that CEOs who have private pilot licenses are associated with riskier firms. These 
kinds of firms usually have higher equity return volatility. And the volatility cannot be 
fully explained by compensation components that financially incentivize risk-taking. 
The results imply that managers’ nonpecuniary risk preferences revealed outside the 
firm influence project selection and corporate policies. Substantial evidence supports 
the finding that CEOs’ characters affect firms’ decisions and influence risk-taking be-
havior. This behavior consistency may explain why researchers are interested in testing 
how top managers’ characteristics affect corporate behavior and performance. 
2.2 Gender stereotype 
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Some researchers argue that the barriers to women’s advancement in corporate America 
do not exist. Within the federal government, the evidence shows that women employees 
are favored in promotion decisions over their male colleagues (Powell & Butterfield, 
1994). In contrast, more studies in corporation management state that the number of 
women executives is still relatively small. From 1987 to 1996, we only find two female 
CEOs (Daily et al.,1999). Among Fortune 500 companies, only 4% of top managers 
are female, and the ratio of female CEOs is even smaller– less than 0.5%(Catalyst,2001). 
We could not say there is a trend that female managers are moving into the executive 
suite. The “glass ceiling” still exists, and it blocks the high-achieving women on the 
way to the board room, which calls governments’ attention to promote legislation to 
increase the female representatives in corporate governance. In California, a new regu-
lation requires that all boards have at least one female board member in 2019 if their 
headquarters are in the state. For boards with six members or more, the new regulation 
also mandates that the firms have at least three women on their boards by 2021. And 
other states are following California’s action. For example, New Jersey comes up with 
legislation modelled after the California law, while Illinois is debating a bill that man-
dates gender and ethnic diversity on boards.5 
To understand the barriers that block women from top management positions, we 
should learn the differences between women and men firstly. The behavioral differences 
between them have been addressed widely in the psychology literature (Levin et al., 
1988; Feingold, 1994; Costa & McCrae, 2001). Croson and Gneezy (2009) find exper-
imental evidence that supports women are more risk-averse and more reluctant to com-
petition than are men. Similarly, Eckel and Grossman (2002) observe that women are 
more likely to choose risk-free gambling; however, they do not find women have 
greater loss aversion compared to men. 
Different risk preference is a typical gender stereotype. Biernat and Kobrynowicz (1997) 
define stereotypes as social judgments of individual group members that lead people to 
 
5 https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/18/u-s-board-diversity-trends-in-2019/ 
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judge group members consistently and exaggeratedly based on group expectations. Sur-
face-level demographic characteristics usually come along with stereotypes, for exam-
ple, race and gender. The stereotypes would lead to gender gaps in self-confidence, 
assessments of others and behavior in cooperation. To explore the effect of gender on 
self-esteem, Bordalo et al. (2019) conduct three laboratory experiments at Ohio State 
University, Harvard Business School and the University of California Santa Barbara to 
collect data on beliefs about self and others’ abilities in different domains. They find 
that stereotyping and overestimation of the ability of both oneself and others are the 
two sources that shape our beliefs about our ability. The overestimation increases with 
the difficulty of the questions from experiments. The authors define this phenomenon 
as difficulty-induced misestimation (DIM). Because of stereotypes, the participants ex-
aggerate the performance gap between different gender. Thus, women become much 
less confident about themselves in domains that are judged more male-typed, for ex-
ample, mathematics and science. Controlling for the category difficulty, both men and 
women tend to underestimate women’s ability in domains where the male advantage is 
significant. Stereotypes and DIM work together to make men more self-confident, 
while women are less self-confident in male-typed domains. 
The announcement of female executives would draw more attention because of their 
rareness in American society. It is natural for shareholders to be skeptical since female 
business leaders are new and different. Kanter's (1977) token status theory analyzes 
gender and gender-role stereotypes in a work context. Kanter creates the term “token 
status” in reference to the experience of women managers at a time when they are un-
derrepresented relative to their male counterparts. In a more extreme situation, solos, 
people are the sole representative of their demographic group within an organization.  
Men occupy the majority of board seats. In other words, the female representation is 
still low in the top executive rank. This situation could also exaggerate the gender gap 
in the board rooms. It has been previously observed that some employers hesitate to 
hire candidates that are demographically different from the majority of employees 
(Neckermann & Kirchenman, 1991). This conclusion is transferable to the board 
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member nomination. Before carrying out the new nomination of a female board mem-
ber, the nominating committee would concern that if the new female member is the best 
choice for a male-domain board room. Tolbert and Oberfield(1991) point out that the 
members of the majority will be uncomfortable, and the dissimilarity will impede trust. 
The majority of the board members – men - need more effort to build trust relationships 
with their female peers while the trust between their male peers can be naturally built. 
All these concerns about female board members' skills and characteristics also give 
investors a negative impression. At the executive rank, female managers are vulnerable 
to critical consequences, such as perceptual biases and detrimental stereotypes (Hitt & 
Barr, 1989; Stroh et al., 1992). Kanter (1977) states that people are likely to misrepre-
sent the role of female managers in token status. They would interpret female managers' 
contribution by following the femininity characteristics rather than following the qual-
ities fit with managers. 
Men are consistently  preferred to women for positions within male-typed domains (Ea-
gly et al., 1995). For jobs occupied by one gender, they are likely to be described fol-
lowing the characteristics of that gender. Men occupy the senior management positions 
earlier than women and took the majority of the positions for these jobs. People believe 
that the attributes to leadership success are consistent with the masculine. The low ratio 
of the women in the board room, from another perspective, supports the misconception 
that women are less qualified in top management positions than their male peers. Shen-
hav (1992) states that men are assumed to be more qualified than women and have more 
characteristics associated with leadership. Thus, top female managers would face neg-
ative expectations from the market since the positions are inconsistent with gender char-
acteristics. Shareholders might doubt female managers’ performance since the feminine 
qualities are highlighted instead of the leadership qualities. 
Previous studies provide two traditional explanations for investment distortions, misa-
lignment of managerial and shareholders’ interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and in-
formation asymmetry between corporate insiders and the capital market (Myers & Maj-
luf, 1984). Malmendier and Tate (2005) argue that managerial overconfidence could 
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account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers are more likely 
to overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as un-
duly costly. By using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment deci-
sions of Forbes 500 CEOs, they classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail 
to reduce their exposure to company-specific risk. This paper also find that investments 
of overconfident CEOs are significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in 
equity-dependent firms. Malmendier et al. (2011) find the same result, which argues 
that managers who believe their firm is undervalued view external financing as over-
priced. Such overconfident managers rely less on external financing. According to the 
research about gender stereotypes, men are more confident about their abilities in male-
typed domains. Therefore, male CEOs are more likely to face the problems of invest-
ment distortions. Huang and Kisgen (2013) compare corporate finance and investment 
decisions made by female executives with those made by male executives. The research 
shows that male executives undertake more acquisitions and issue debt more often than 
female executives. In terms of return, acquisitions made by firms with male executives 
have announcement returns approximately 2% lower than those made by female man-
agers, and firms with male executives also have lower announcement debt returns. Be-
sides, female managers are more likely to exercise stock options early, which implies 
their under-confidence. All of the evidence supports that male executives show relative 
overconfidence in significant corporate decision making compared with female execu-
tives. 
2.3  CEO gender, corporate governance 
2.3.1 Women in the boardroom 
Economic interactions involve some form of risk. The common stereotype is that 
women are more risk-averse than men, and this stereotype is crucial since it can poten-
tially explain important economic phenomena. Charness and Gneezy (2012) report that 
women make smaller investments in risky assets than men, and so appear to be finan-
cially more risk averse. The laboratory findings combining with empirical findings 
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from investment decisions developed an important step in understanding the essential 
features of gender differences in risk-taking.  
The gender differences in risk-taking could provide some insights of gender pay gap. 
Economists have attempted to offer a complete explanation of the gender pay gap for a 
long time; however, a knowledge gap remains in this research. Manning and Saidi 
(2010) use data from the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS), 
which contains information on the nature of the payment schemes, to show that fewer 
women in establishments use variable (as opposed to fixed) pay. Similarly, Bernasek 
and Shwiff (2001) state that women are more conservative investors than men. In the 
same situation, women take less risk in the allocation of their defined contribution pen-
sions. 
Considering the behavioral consistency in corporate finance, it would be worth inspect-
ing how female board members affect boards’ performance since they have different 
risk preference from male board members. Adams and Ferreira (2009) claim that gender 
diversity has a significant impact on board inputs. Female directors have better attend-
ance performance compared to their male colleagues. The higher the fraction of female 
directors on the board, the better the attendance record of male directors. Also, women 
are likely to join monitoring-related committees, such as audit, nominating and corpo-
rate governance committees; however, men are likely to sit on compensation commit-
tees. A gender-diverse board is more easily monitored, and the compensation is rela-
tively more equity-based. However, this paper concludes that higher gender diversity 
on boards lead to worsened firm performance. In the previous study (Almazan & Suarez, 
2003), researchers state that too much board monitoring can hurt shareholders’ interest. 
Therefore, it would be reasonable to say that gender diversity increases firm value when 
board monitoring could add to the firm value. 
Gender diversity could also impact board output significantly. Using Fama and French 
valuation framework to measure the level of risk, Francoeur et al. (2008) state that the 
participation of women in the firm could enhance financial performance. For firms have 
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high fraction of women officers, they would earn positive and significant abnormal re-
turns in complex environments; however, they do not find evidence that a high propor-
tion of female directors on board could bring positive abnormal returns. Nevertheless, 
boards with high proportion of female directors still could earn normal market returns. 
Furthermore, Krishnan and Parsons (2008) investigate how gender diversity in senior 
management affects earning quality, which is defined as the degree to which reported 
earnings capture economic reality. There is a positive relationship between gender di-
versity in senior management and earnings quality. Moreover, companies are likely to 
have higher stock returns after initial public offerings when they have more female rep-
resentatives in senior management. Similarly, Carter et al. (2003) find that gender and 
ethnic diversity of the board is positively associated with firm performance measured 
by Tobin’s Q.  
However, some researchers get different conclusions. Sila et al. (2010) examine 
whether gender diversity affects firms' risk-taking using a sample of US firms from 
1996-2010. There is no evidence that female boardroom representation influences eq-
uity risk. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) test the impact on firm valuation of mandated fe-
male board representation. In 2003, firms face a new law requiring that 40% of Norwe-
gian firms' directors be women; this increase is a significant since only 9% of directors 
were women at that time. They find that the constraint imposed by the quota caused the 
stock price to drop significantly after the law was announced. The companies also ex-
perienced a large decline in Tobin's Q over the following years. The quota made the 
boards younger and less experienced, which caused deterioration in operating perfor-
mance. 
It is difficult to find evidence to show whether women make better CEOs since a “glass 
ceiling” prevents women from advancing to senior positions, and females are highly 
underrepresented among CEOs of top corporations (Morrison & Von Glinow, 1990; 
Thomas & Gabarro, 1999). Weber and Zulehner (2010) investigate the relationship be-
tween female first hires of start-up firms and business success. Since start-up firms are 
small and risky enterprises, they are particularly sensitive to managers’ decisions. If 
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there is an effect of gender diversity in leading ranks, we should see it in start-ups. This 
research document that start-up firms with female first hires show a higher likelihood 
of survival. Faccio et al. (2016) demonstrate that female CEOs usually manage firms 
that have lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and more chances to survive than sim-
ilar firms run by male CEOs. In addition, they also point out transitions from male to 
female CEOs would lead to an economically and statistically significant decrease in 
corporate risk-taking. In terms of privately-owned firms in the U.S, there is evidence 
that supports the conclusion that female-owned firms have lower leverage than male-
owned firms. (Cole, 2013) 
2.3.2 Banking industry  
The environment of the banking industry is different from other industries. Many bank 
regulations are concerned with moral hazard problems arising from the provision of 
fixed-rate deposit insurance. For instance, to the extent that the FDIC insures depositors 
against losses, they would be indifferent to the riskiness of a bank’s investment and 
financing strategies. Thus, bank shareholders would face more significant risk-taking 
incentives than shareholders of other levered firms. Chen et al. (2005) argue that the 
results for industrial firms could not necessarily be generalized to the banking industry. 
Based on the research from Houston and James (1995), the compensation structure in 
the banking industry differs significantly from the structure in other industries, not only 
in terms of total compensation but also in terms of the relative importance of the indi-
vidual elements that comprise total compensation. 
Berger et al. (2014) construct a dataset based on the entire population of German bank 
executive teams from 1994 to 2010. This research indicates that younger executive 
teams increase risk-taking. Interestingly, the increase in the proportion of female exec-
utives also leads to riskier conduct of business. In contrast, if board changes result in a 
higher proportion of executives have Ph.D. degrees, risk-taking declines. 
Previous studies prove that female loan officers are more risk-averse compared to their 
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male colleagues so that female loan officers could decrease banks’ risk-taking (Bellucci 
et al., 2010; Beck et al., 2010). Further to public-facing loan officer’s effect on the 
bank’s risk-taking, upper management also influences risk. Palvia et al. (2015) examine 
if the gender of the bank's CEO and Chairperson of the board influence the bank's cap-
ital ratios and default risk. They use extensive panel data of U.S. commercial banks 
from 2007 to 2010 since the financial crisis in 2008 is marked with high levels of bank 
distress and quite a few bank failures, this period would provide a platform to study the 
effects of female CEOs and Chairpersons on the bank failure. The capital levels of fe-
male-led banks are higher, which suggests a more conservative management strategy. 
Additionally, the empirical results show that female CEOs and Chairwomen are nega-
tively associated with bank failures during the crisis. Regarding the sizes of banks, the 
smaller female-led banks are more likely to survive. Compared to large banks, those 
small ones lack the ability to absorb market shocks and under loose regulatory environ-
ment. Thus, being conservative is crucial in this case. 
In contrast, some research get different conclusions. Based on a sample of 365 banks 
from the 2007 CRSP-FRB Link file of the Federal Reserve of New York, Adams and 
Ragunathan (2017) demonstrate that women are not more risk-averse than men in the 
finance industry. Banks with more female directors do not have a lower risk than other 
banks during the crisis, but they have better performances than the banks with fewer 
female directors. Thus, they suggest an alternative policy focus than board gender quo-
tas since diversity is valuable in a crisis. 
Saparito, Elam and Brush (2013) study the bank-firm relationship to find the gender’s 
impact on firm owner and bank manager. The three measurements of relationship are 
trust, satisfaction with credit access and bank knowledge. The sample contains 696 
matched firm manager and bank manager pairs. The male-male pairs receive the highest 
scores among these three categories, while female-female pairs have the lowest scores 
for each measure. To sum up, previous studies get controversial conclusions about 
whether and how female officers and CEOs affect banks’ risk-taking. Besides, female 
managers are less trusted by customers compared to their male colleagues in banks.  
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2.4 Investors’ reaction to female directors 
Previous literature argues that a gender-diverse board is a positive signal not only for 
investors but also for employees. A higher fraction of female board members indicates 
a higher work-force diversity, which is also a competitive advantage of a company 
(Rose, 2007; Richard, 2000). Using the standard financial event study method, Kang et 
al. (2010) claim that investors generally hold a positive opinion on the appointment of 
women directors in Singaporean firms. Generally speaking, Singapore’s society has an 
open mind about higher status women since business leaders and popular press there 
support the benefits of a gender-diverse board.  
Using Kanter’s token status theory, Lee and James (2007) investigate societal responses 
to top executive announcements (including CEO, CFO, COO, President and Executive 
Vice President) from Factiva searches covering the Wall Street Journal, newswires, 
newspapers and press releases from 1990 to 2000. They find that investors respond 
negatively to the announcements of female CEOs. But the reactions are less negatively 
to the female CEOs who are promoted internally. 
2.5 Institutional investor 
In 2017, institutional investors held over 80% of the shares of the largest companies in 
the U.S., such as Apple, J.P. Morgan Chase, Microsoft and Facebook. Different from 
other types of firms, financial institutions do not make and sell commodities. Clark and 
Monk (2013) state that human capital, the process of decision making, and the data and 
information infrastructure and architecture are three intangible assets that financial in-
stitutions depend upon. Industries, which are human capital intensive, are characterized 
have flat hierarchies. This fact gives senior managers a great deal of authority over the 
production process. Thus, we would like to know more about the institutions’ CEOs 
and their impact on investment decisions. 
Back to the last century, if institutional investors were dissatisfied with investee firms’ 
managerial or stock performance, they would simply sell their holdings. With the 
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increase of institutional holdings, previous studies point out that institutional investors 
need to choose between exercising monitoring efforts for shared gain and trading for 
investors’ interest (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Maug,1998; Kahn & Winton, 1998). For 
large institutions holding a large number of portfolio stocks, they are more likely to be 
sensitive to corporate governance mechanisms. One possible explanation is that those 
mechanisms could be a means for decreasing monitoring costs (Bushee et al., 2013). 
The study done by Coffee (1991) shows that monitoring has become less costly since 
institutions hold significant shares of companies.  
Chen et al. (2007) construct a cost-benefit framework to investigate institutions moni-
toring and concluded that institutional investors choose to monitor rather than trade 
when the monitoring benefits exceed costs. The monitoring could also provide infor-
mational advantages that institutions can use to adjust their portfolios. They group the 
institutional investors that have less willingness to monitor investee firms’ management 
decisions as “grey” institutional investors. This kind of institution mainly focuses on 
protecting the existing and potential business relationships, so they try to avoid chal-
lenging investee firm’s decisions. In contrast, the other group of institutional investors, 
“independent” institutional investors, are not interested in build a business relationship 
with the investee. If they are not satisfied with corporate performance, they will sell 
their shares. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, Chen et al. argue that 
only independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring 
instead of trading. 
Based on the category of institutional investors done by Chen et al. (2007), researchers 
start investigating different kinds of institutional investors separately. As for independ-
ent institutional investors, Francis et al. (2019) conduct the first research to examine if 
and why activist hedge funds more likely to target female CEOs. They control the dif-
ferences in firm fundamentals, CEO personal characteristics, and CEO compensation 
packages, then confirmed that female-led firms are preferred targets. The evidence in-
dicates that the differences in managerial and leadership styles between women and 
men CEOs lead to the hedge funds’ preference for women CEOs. This finding is 
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consistent with psychology research, which reveals that female managers use strong 
communication and interpersonal skills to purse the greater good; however, male man-
agers are more likely to be self-centered, risk-taking and aggressive. Francis et al. also 
state that, after being targeted by activist hedge funds, female CEOs would face a de-
crease in compensation and increases in pay-for-performance and turnover ratios. Usu-
ally women are more vulnerable than their male peers because they are risk-averse and 
not willing to exercise self-defensive actions. 
2.6 Hypothesis development 
Female CEOs are rare in the business world. According to the token theory, Kanter 
(1977) claims that people are likely to misrepresent the role of female managers in to-
ken status. Their contribution would be associated with femininity rather than with the 
qualities fit with managers. And these stereotypes shape our beliefs about the charac-
teristics of different genders: both men and women tend to underestimate women’s abil-
ity in male-typed domains. Top executive positions have been male-dominated for a 
long time, so the market would be cautious about female business leaders.  
With the increase of institutional ownership in U.S. market, institutions’ different traits 
trigger researchers’ interest. Following the category of institutional investors by Chen 
et al. (2007), we group the type 1 (banks) and type 2 (insurance companies) institutions 
from Thomson Reuters 13F database as passive institutional investors. The passive in-
stitutions’ preference is maintaining good relationships with investee firms, so the mon-
itoring cost is high due to the risk of hurting their business with investees. These passive 
institutions are less willing to monitor investee firms’ management. In other words, it 
is not worthy for them to influence the composition of investee firm’s board.  
Previous study shows that activist hedge funds, which belong to independent institu-
tional investors, view female CEOs as preferred targets, because women have strong 
communication and interpersonal skills (Francis et al., 2019). Our research will focus 
on the passive institutional investors. Comparing to independent institutional investors, 
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passive institutional investors are less willing to monitor investee firms. That makes 
one of the female CEOs’ characteristics - good at communication, less valuable. Thus, 
stereotypes that men are assumed to be more qualified than women and have more 
characteristics associated with leadership, would have greater impact on passive insti-
tutions when they make choices. These stereotypes would make female CEOs show 
more disadvantages compared to male CEOs. So, we have our first hypothesis:  
H1: Passive institutions invest more in firms with male CEOs.  
Previous studies support that CEOs’ characters affect firms’ decisions and influence 
risk-taking behavior (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Cronqvist et al., 2010; Cain & Mckeon, 
2016). Substantial evidence supports that women are more risk-averse than men 
(Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Eckel & Grossman, 2002). Considering the behavioral dif-
ferences between men and women, which have been addressed widely in the psychol-
ogy literature, it is reasonable to assume that these differences would span across per-
sonal and professional situations.  
Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that male executives undertake more acquisitions and 
issue debt more often than female executives. To be specific with the CEO position, the 
work of Faccio et al. (2016) shows that firms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, 
less volatile earnings, and a higher chance of survival than similar firms run by male 
CEOs. Previous studies in this area prove that women are the more risk-averse business 
leaders than their male peers. In this study, the dependent variable stands for the weight 
of this S&P 500 company in the institution’s portfolio. The smaller the portfolio weight, 
the less investment made by institution in each investee company, which implies insti-
tution diversifies its investment to decrease risk of holdings. Thus, through the change 
of dependent variable, we are able to investigate the institution’s risk preference. Then, 
we develop our second hypothesis: 
H2: Institutions run by female CEOs are likely to invest less in a single investee. 
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3. Data and research design 
3.1 Sample source 
Following previous research (Brickley et al., 1988; Cornett et al., 2004; Almazan et al., 
2005; Chen et al., 2007), we adopt the classification that the type 1 (banks) and type 2 
(insurance companies) institutions belong to the passive investor group. This category 
is based on the institution’s potential business relationship with the invested firm. These 
passive institutions aim to maintain existing or potential business; therefore, they are 
less likely to engage in management decisions. In other words, they might not actively 
monitor the investee firms’ managers because of the risk of possibly damaging the busi-
ness relationship. 
To create these classifications, we obtain the institutional holding data from the Thom-
son Reuters 13F database, which is widely used in research of institutional investors 
(Chen et al., 2007; Francis et al., 2019). We collect the stock holdings files from this 
database from 2001 to 2017 and kept data on passive institutions (banks and insurance 
firms). With such criterion, we retrieve passive institutions’ holding information. Next, 
we gather each year’s S&P 500 company list and their accounting information from 
Compustat Annual Updates – Index Constituents between 2001 and 2017. We match 
passive institutions with S&P 500 companies through investee firms’ tickers in each 
year.  
Once the list of companies is complete, gender and other aspects have to be assigned to 
each company. To investigate how gender affects institutional investors’ decisions, in-
formation about CEOs’ genders and other characteristics was gathered from BoardEx. 
Management Diagnostics, Ltd. constructed BoardEx to provide information including 
personal characteristics, educational background, employment history, social networks 
and compensation packages. The database contains information about U.S. companies 
whose market capitalization is larger than $10 million. Finally, to exclude the impact 
of fundamental differences of a firm’s performance metrics on institutional investors, 
we calculate firm level control variables based on the accounting information of S&P 
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500 companies from Compustat. Our final sample consist of 27,213 merged institution-
firm observations between 2001 and 2017. 
3.2 Variable construction 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
To investigate how CEO gender affects institutional investment decisions, the institu-
tions’ stock holding data is used as the dependent portfolio. The dependent variable 
portfolio weight represents institutional investors’ willingness to invest in different in-
vestee firms. We use i represents investee firms, j stands for institutional investors and 
t shows the year. Equation (1) presents the model to calculate the willingness measure: 
𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑂 𝑊𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑗,𝑡
……………………………………………………(3.1) 
where 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑗,𝑡 is a institution’s portfolio holding in that year. As for the calculation of 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑗,𝑡, we sum up all the stock holdings in institution’s account at market value, 
which can be expressed as following: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑗,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1  …………….(3.2) 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the investment from one institution to the S&P 500 company in that 
year, which can be calculated as following: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡     ……..(3.3) 
Larger 𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑂 𝑊𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  indicates institutional investor prefer this certain 
company to others in its account. 
3.2.2 Key explanatory variables 
To investigate gender’s impact on investment decisions, we adopt the most common 
approach to measure a CEO gender using dummy variables 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  and 
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑡 (Lee & James, 2007; Francis et al., 2019). We collect the gender of both 
S&P 500 firms and passive institutions CEOs from BoardEx. When the investee firm 
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has a female CEO, 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 would be 1; otherwise it is 0.  For institution with a female 
CEO,  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑡 would be equal to 1, or it would be 0. Previous studies only in-
vestigate the gender impact from investee firm; however, how institutions distribute 
their portfolio would be also be influenced by institutions CEOs’ characteristics. 
Through these two gender dummy variables, we are able to measure their effects on 
portfolio weight simultaneously. 
3.2.3 Control variables 
Following the literature, we obtain control variables from both investee firm’s and 
CEO’s characteristics, including market vale, total asset, Tobin’s Q, sales’ growth, ROA, 
leverage, pay out ratio, research and development intensity, cash holding and CEO’s 
age and nationality. These variables are all important factors that influence institutions’ 
preferences. The details of these variables are shown in the following paragraphs. In 
addition, two control variables that represent institutions’ investment situation have 
been added into account. Total is defined as institution’s portfolio value in that year; 
num_invest shows the number of companies that in institution’s account. We calculate 
these two variables using the institutional holding information extracted from the 
Thomson Reuters 13F database. 
Firm Characteristics:  
Investors could make their decisions based on firm’s fundamentals. Following literature 
to exclude the impacts of differences among investee firms’ fundamentals, we employ 
market value, total asset, Tobin’s Q, sales’ growth, ROA, leverage, payout ratio, R&D 
intensity and cash holdings of investee firms as firm level control variables (Francis et 
al. 2019). The size of investee firm is controlled through firm market value (natural 
logarithm of market value). We also adopt market-based measure of firm’s performance 
from Adams and Ferreira (2009) by controlling Tobin’s Q and ROA. Tobin’s Q repre-
sents the relationship between market valuation and intrinsic value. In our empirical 
study, we define Tobin’s Q as the ratio of market vale of asset to book value of asset. 
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The market value is the sum of market value of common and preferred stock, short term 
debt and book value of long-term debt. A higher Tobin’s Q is a signal of stock overval-
uing, which indicates higher risk with the company. Besides, literature shows that firms 
with female CEOs have higher Tobin’s Q, which indicates female style management 
enhances firm performance (Dezso & Ross, 2008). The ratio of net income to total as-
sets (ROA) is used as a measure of operating performance. We calculate ROA by di-
viding net income by total asset of the firm. The higher the ROA, the better the firm’s 
performance. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current 
liabilities to shareholders’ equity. The increase in leverage will push managers to en-
hance firm’s performance since the creditors would monitor them more closely (Harris 
& Raviv, 1990).   
We also control payout ratio because different dividend policies would affect investor’s 
decision. The R&D intensity is calculated by dividing Research & Development ex-
pense by total asset. Through this measure, we could control different innovation strat-
egies’ impacts. Cash holdings would reflect firm’s finance policy, so we control cash 
holdings through dividing cash and short-term investment by total asset. And dummy 
variable Invested equals to 1 if the firm received investment from any institutional in-
vestor, which represents institutional ownership. The reason of controlling the presence 
of institutions is some institutions pressure firms toward diversity, for instance, 
CalPERS and TIAA-CREF. 
CEO characteristics: 
CEO’s personality has a huge influence on company’s decision making and perfor-
mance (Malmendier et al., 2011). As the purpose of this research is to explore how CEO 
gender affects investment, we control CEO’s age and nationality for both of investee 
firms and institutions. Previous study assert that younger executive teams increase risk-
taking (Berger et al., 2014). While Malmendier and Nagel (2011) argue that older CEOs 
are more likely to be overconfident because of their long experience in industry. Thus, 
we control ages of both investee firm CEOs and passive institutions CEOs. Following 
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Francis et al. (2019), we also incorporate CEO’s nationality as a control variable.  We 
create dummy variables American and Inst_american. When CEO has American citi-
zenship, the dummy variable would be coded as 1; otherwise it is 0. The detail of vari-
able construction is shown in the following table. 
Table 3.1 Variable Definition 
Variable Symbol Definition Source 
Gender of Investee Firm’s 
CEO 
female Dummy variable equals to 1 
if target firm’s CEO is female 
Thomson Reuters 
13F; BoardEx 
Gender of Institutional In-
vestor’s CEO 
instfemale Dummy variable equals to 1 
if institution’s CEO is female 
Thomson Reuters 
13F; BoardEx 
Number of the companies 
in account 
num_invest Total number of the compa-
nies one institution invests in  
Thomson Reuters 
13F 
Institution’s total invest-
ment amount 
total Institution’s investment 
amount 
Thomson Reuters 
13F 
Institutional ownership invested Dummy variable equals to 1 
if S&P 500 firm is invested 
by institution investor 
Thomson Reuters 
13F 
 
Market value of investee 
firm 
marketvalue Natural logarithm of market 
value 
Compustat 
Total asset of investee 
firm 
lnat Natural logarithm of market 
value 
Compustat 
Tobin’s Q of investee firm tobinsq Market Value/ Replacement 
cost 
Compustat 
Sales’ growth of investee 
firm 
salesgrowth Salet /Salet-1 -1 Compustat 
ROA of investee firm roa Net Income/ Total Asset Compustat 
Leverage of investee firm leverage (Long-term debt total+ debt 
in current liabilities) / Share-
holders’ equity-total 
Compustat 
Pay out ratio of investee 
firm 
payoutratio (Dividends-preferred+Divi-
dends-common+ Purchase of 
common and preferred 
stock)/ Income before ex-
traordinary items 
Compustat 
Research and develop-
ment intensity of investee 
firm 
rdintensity Research & Development ex-
pense/Total asset 
Compustat 
Cash holding of investee 
firm 
cashhold-
ings 
Cash and short-term invest-
ment / Total asset 
Compustat 
Age of investee firm’s 
CEO 
age Age of the S&P 500 com-
pany’s CEO 
BoardEx 
Nationality of investee 
firm’s CEO 
american Dummy variable equals to 1 
if the nationality of S&P 500 
company’s CEO is American 
BoardEx 
Age of institution’s CEO instage Age of the institution’s CEO BoardEx 
Nationality of institu-
tion’s CEO 
instameri-
can 
Dummy variable equals to 1 
if the nationality of institu-
tion’s CEO is American 
BoardEx 
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After controlling the firm’s and CEO’s characteristics, we are able to isolate the impact 
of a CEO’s gender on investment decision making. Table 3.2 presents the summary 
statistics for all variables. More interestingly, Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics 
for investee firms that are led by female and male CEOs, respectively. 
 
Table 3.2 Key statistics of the sample 
This table presents the summary statistics of the major dependent and independent variables. The de-
pendent variable, portfolio weight is measured by the institution’s holding of one company as a percent-
age of its total holding in that year. 
Symbol N MEAN STD MIN MAX 
Portfolio 
Weight 
28,116 0.002 0.004 0 0.167 
female 28,116 0.024 0.154 0 1 
instfemale 27,191 0.015 0.123 0 1 
num_invest 27,191 1987.966 1438.573 111 7582 
total 27,191 52,100M 90,300M 320M 386,000M 
invested 28,116 0.967 0.179 0 1 
marketvalue 26,707 9.731 1.115 5.653 13.580 
lnat 28,116     9.780     1.396    5.790    14.761 
tobinq 28,061     1.671     1.275    0.047    14.279 
salegrowth 28,116     0.082     0.187   -2.648 7.110 
roa 28,115     0.069     0.061   -0.747 0.503 
Leverage 28,116     1.192     3.500           0 88.370 
Payoutratio 28,116     0.759     0.466           0 1.998 
Rdintensity 28,116     0.022     0.041           0 0.605 
Cashholdings 27,480     0.081     0.082           0 0.632 
Age_num 27,844   65.513 7.205 33 96 
American 28,116     0.780     0.414 0 1 
instage_num 27,191     66.721     5.186 48 96 
instamerican 27,191      0.754     0.431 0 1 
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Table 3.3a Key statistics of the sample – Female-led investee firms 
This table presents the summary statistics of the major dependent and independent variables from female 
CEOs-led firms. The dependent variable, portfolio weight is measured by the institution’s holding of one 
company as a percentage of its total holding in that year. 
 Female-led Investee firms 
Symbol N MEAN STD MIN MAX 
Portfolioweight 679   0.0022     0.0034 0 0.0176 
female 679 1 0 1 1 
instfemale 621      0.0177     0.1320           0 1 
num_invest 621 1909.245     1331.711 111 7582 
total 621 58,700M     98,900M 355M 386,000M 
invested 679 0.9146 0.2797 0 1 
marketvalue 648 10.3801 1.0623 6.5146   12.2739 
lnat 679 10.1649     1.1513    6.8051    12.3090 
tobinq 678 1.8673     1.2642    0.4527    6.8485 
salegrowth 679 0.0483      0.1060    -.4922    0.5861 
roa 679 0.0833     0.0538   -.0045    0.2417 
Leverage 679 1.9768      5.8499 0 65.8383 
Payoutratio 679 0.8988       0.3932 0 1.8388 
Rdintensity 679 0.0225     0.0432 0 0.3277 
Cashholdings 654 0.0961     0.0734 0.0026     0.3705 
Age_num 679 62.1532      3.7425 42 71 
American 679 0.7482     0.4344 0 1 
Instage_num 621 65.5797     5.0910 55 79 
instamerican 621 0.6908     0.4625 0 1 
 
Table 3.3b Key statistics of the sample –Male-led investee firms 
This table presents the summary statistics of the major dependent and independent variables from male 
CEOs-led firms. The dependent variable, portfolio weight is measured by the institution’s holding of one 
company as a percentage of its total holding in that year. 
 Male-led investee firms 
Symbol N MEAN STD MIN MAX 
Portfolioweight 27,437     0.0020      0.0045           0 0.1667 
female 27,437 0 0 0 0 
instfemale 26,570     .0154     0.1230 0 1 
num_invest 26,570     1989.806     1440.946 111 7582 
total 26,570 51,900M 90,100M 320M 386,000M 
invested 27,437     0.9683     0.1753 0 1 
marketvalue 26,059     9.7144     1.1110    5.6533 13.5799 
lnat 27,437     9.7709     1.3996    5.7901    14.7606 
tobinq 27,383     1.6665     1.2746    0.0470    14.2788 
salegrowth 27,437     0.0827     0.1888   -2.6481    7.1101 
roa 27,437     0.0689       0.0615   -1.0007    0.5034 
Leverage 27,437     1.1724     3.4188           0 88.3704 
Payoutratio 27,437     0.7558      0.4671           0 1.9982 
Rdintensity 27,437     0.0216      0.0404           0 0.6048 
Cashholdings 26,826     0.0802     0.0816           0 0.6322 
Age_num 27,165     65.5974     7.2502 33 96 
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American 27,437     0.7807     0.4138 0 1 
Instage_num 26,570     66.7486 5.1854 48 96 
instamerican 26,570     0.7559     0.4296 0 1 
According to Table 3.3, female-led S&P 500 firms are associated with higher market 
value and total assets. Consistent with Dezso and Ross (2008), female-led S&P 500 
companies have higher Tobin’s Q on average. Female-led firms are also more likely to 
pay dividends based on their higher payout ratio. For CEO’s characteristics, female 
CEOs are younger compared to male CEOs, which is in line with previous research 
(Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). These differences between female-led and male-led firms 
might cause investors’ different preferences, so this research control these variables to 
focus on CEO’s gender’s effect.   
3.3 Research design 
Kang et al. (2010) investigate investors reaction to female directors by running regres-
sion on cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). While Francis et al. (2019) test 
the firm’s probability of being targeted by activist hedge funds through employing logit 
regressions. They use the dummy variable Target to measure hedge funds’ investment 
willingness, which equals 1 if a firm is targeted by at least one hedge fund activist in a 
given year. We employ two approaches to test our research questions. First, we test how 
CEO’s gender influence institutions investment decisions. Using 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
represents institutional investors’ willingness to in different investee firms as dependent 
variable, through multivariate analysis, we control the characteristics of investee firms 
and CEOs as well as the investment situations of institutions.   
we construct model as following: 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽12𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽16𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽17𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽18𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇………………..(3.4) 
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The second approach is to replace one of the key explanatory variable Female with 
Female ratio, then run fixed-effect multivariate regression. Female ratio is the propor-
tion of female directors at the annual report date selected, which measures gender di-
versity of firms’ boards. This regression could reveal if institutions value the gender 
diversity of investee firms. For robustness, we divide our sample into two periods: pre-
2008 and past-2008, and run regression separately. Comparing the results from those 
two periods could show whether and how institutions’ attitude towards female CEOs 
changes. 
Our dependent variable 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is censored with range from 0 to 1. Thus, 
we adopt Tobit regression model. The Tobit model, also called a censored regression 
model, is designed to estimate linear relationships between variables when there is ei-
ther left- or right- censoring in the dependent variable. It modifies the likelihood func-
tion so that it reflects the unequal sampling for each observation depending on whether 
the latent dependent variable fell above or below the determined threshold. We also 
control the year fixed effect considering macro-economic factors vary in years.  
Table 3.4 Key statistics of the institutions 
Year Number of Institutions Average Number of Holdings  
of S&P 500 companies 
2001 35 26.09 
2002 36 36.14 
2003 41 35.49 
2004 40 39.10 
2005 39 47.41 
2006 33 47.52 
2007 32 54.06 
2008 32 51.72 
2009 35 48.66 
2010 37 62.30 
2011 90 19.01 
2012 86 19.90 
2013 95 19.59 
2014 84 21.56 
2015 79 19.99 
2016 72 23.72 
2017 68 20.99 
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Table 3.4 shows the number of institutions from our sample in each year. Table 3.5 
presents the Pearson correlation matrix of the variables used in our study. 
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Table 3.5 Correlation Table 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  portfolioweight female instfemale num_invest total invested marketvalue lnat tobinq salegrowth 
(1) portfolioweight 1          
(2) female 0.0162* 1         
(3) instfemale -0.0271*** 0.00346 1        
(4) num_invest -0.105*** -0.00969 0.0192** 1       
(5) total -0.0553*** 0.00951 0.0609*** 0.811*** 1      
(6) invested 0.00566 0.00193 0.00155 0.00458 0.00526 1     
(7) marketvalue 0.518*** 0.0911*** 0.0216*** -0.133*** -0.0168** 0.00988 1    
(8) lnat 0.367*** 0.0518*** 0.0753*** -0.111*** -0.0272*** 0.00371 0.719*** 1   
(9) tobinq 0.0706*** 0.0301*** -0.0321*** -0.0139* 0.00946 0.00772 0.165*** -0.443*** 1  
(10) salegrowth 0.00499 -0.0226*** 0.00499 0.0235*** 0.00595 -0.00128 0.0354*** -0.0523*** 0.148*** 1 
(11) roa 0.127*** 0.0374*** -0.0462*** -0.0215*** 0.00492 0.0101 0.212*** -0.262*** 0.578*** 0.119*** 
(12) leverage 0.00255 0.0186** 0.00555 -0.00138 0.00297 0.00103 -0.0183** 0.0819*** -0.0495*** -0.0328*** 
(13) payoutratio 0.0737*** 0.0424*** 0.0117 -0.0565*** -0.00202 5.09E-05 0.153*** 0.0805*** 0.0584*** -0.177*** 
(14) rdintensity 0.0432*** 0.00588 -0.0220*** 0.0128* 0.00904 0.00118 0.0831*** -0.215*** 0.449*** 0.0700*** 
(15) cashholdings -0.0412*** 0.0311*** -0.0296*** 0.0359*** 0.0301*** 0.0111 -0.0540*** -0.337*** 0.396*** 0.0502*** 
(16) age_num 0.0292*** -0.0722*** -0.0715*** 0.0114 -0.0963*** -0.0078 -0.0809*** 0.00206 -0.0933*** 0.0364*** 
(17) american 0.0407*** -0.0167** -0.0409*** -0.00267 -0.0399*** -0.0066 0.0321*** 0.128*** -0.132*** 0.00761 
(18) instage_num 0.0661*** -0.0318*** -0.126*** -0.290*** -0.495*** -0.0170** -0.0473*** -0.0319*** -0.00252 0.0593*** 
(19) instamerican -0.0616*** -0.0239*** -0.152*** 0.401*** 0.229*** -0.00716 -0.151*** -0.126*** -0.00435 0.0380*** 
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  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(11) roa 1         
(12) leverage -0.0676*** 1        
(13) payoutratio 0.146*** 0.0236*** 1       
(14) rdintensity 0.118*** -0.0704*** -0.0122 1      
(15) cashholdings 0.297*** -0.0698*** -0.0272*** 0.415*** 1     
(16) age_num -0.0541*** -0.00937 -0.0738*** -0.102*** -0.136*** 1    
(17) american -0.0965*** -0.0384*** -0.0208*** -0.102*** -0.0885*** 0.282*** 1   
(18) instage_num -0.0359*** -0.00057 -0.0250*** 0.00187 -0.0499*** 0.249*** 0.110*** 1  
(19) instamerican -0.0313*** -0.00176 -0.0486*** 0.0165** -0.00275 0.122*** 0.0352*** -0.0239*** 1 
 ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"       
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4. Results 
4.1 Main regression results 
As shown in Table 4.1, we test H1 and H2 using the Tobit regression method. These two hy-
potheses have statistically significant coefficients. We run regression without CEOs’ character-
istics’ control variables, shown in Column 1 of Table 4.1. Both of the regression results for the 
female indicator and instfemale indicator are negatively significant. Column 3 represents data 
once we add CEOs’ characteristics’ control variables of investee firms and institutions. In this 
case, we still hold the same conclusion as with Column 1 data. In addition, we control the year 
fixed effect based on Column 3 data, and this regression result is listed in Column 5, consider-
ing that macro-economic factors vary in different years. The regression results for the female 
indicator and instfemale indicator are still negatively significant. Then in Column 6, we add 
firm fixed effect control based on Column 5 data. The coefficient of the female indicator is 
negatively significant at 5%. As female is a dummy variable and equals 1 if the investee firm 
has a female CEO, the coefficient here represents the difference in change of the dependent 
variable, compared to that of male-led investee firms. Having a female CEO would decrease 
the investee firm’s weight in the institution’s portfolio by 0.04%. The negatively significant 
coefficient shows that the firms with female CEOs are less invested compared to the firms with 
male CEOs. This regression result supports our first hypothesis: passive institutions regard 
male CEOs as preferred targets. 
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Table 4.1 Multivariate Tobit regression on the impact of gender on fraction of institutions’ invest-
ments 
The sample includes all the passive institutions’ holding of S&P 500 companies. The dependent variable, portfo-
lio weight is measured by the institution’s holding of one company as a percentage of its total holding in that 
year. Independent variables are: female, the dummy variable female equals to 1 if S&P firm’s CEO is female.; 
instfemale, the dummy variable instfemale equals to 1 if institution’s CEO is female. The control variables at the 
institution level are: num_invest, total number of the companies one institution invests in; total, Institution’s to-
tal investment amount. Control variables at the investee firms’ level: marketvalue, natural logarithm of market 
value; lnat, natural logarithm of total asset; tobinq, Tobin’s Q of investee firm; salegrowth, sales’ growth of in-
vestee firm; roa, ROA of investee firm; leverage, leverage of investee firm; payoutratio, pay out ratio of investee 
firm; rdintensity, research and development intensity of investee firm; cashholdings, cash holding of investee 
firm; invested, institutional ownership. The control variables at CEO level: age_num, age of investee firm’s 
CEO; american, nationality of investee firm’s CEO; instage_num, age of institution’s CEO; instamerican, na-
tionality of institution’s CEO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Portfolio 
Weight 
Portfolio 
Weight 
Portfolio 
Weight 
Portfolio 
Weight 
Portfolio 
Weight 
Portfolio 
Weight 
              
female -0.00094*** -0.00094*** -0.00083*** -0.00089*** -0.00067*** -0.00040** 
 [-5.63] [-5.63] [-4.94] [-5.48] [-4.05] [-1.99] 
instfemale -0.00117*** -0.00117*** -0.00070*** -0.00070*** -0.00038* -0.00044** 
 [-5.69] [-5.71] [-3.30] [-3.35] [-1.75] [-2.34] 
num_invest 0.00000  -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -0.00000*** 
 [0.18]  [-4.81] [-4.86] [-8.41] [-10.68] 
total -0.00000*** -0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 
 [-4.89] [-8.22] [3.21] [3.23] [6.50] [7.92] 
invested 0.00034  0.00091    
 [0.18]  [0.46]    
marketvalue 0.00237*** 0.00237*** 0.00243*** 0.00240*** 0.00232*** 0.00182*** 
 [43.26] [43.36] [43.80] [43.95] [96.65] [24.03] 
lnat -0.00024*** -0.00024*** -0.00027*** -0.00025***   
 [-4.95] [-4.95] [-5.34] [-4.99]   
tobinq -0.00027*** -0.00027*** -0.00029*** -0.00028*** -0.00015*** -0.00002 
 [-7.49] [-7.50] [-7.96] [-7.83] [-5.50] [-0.57] 
salegrowth -0.00037*** -0.00037*** -0.00056*** -0.00054*** -0.00065*** -0.00009 
 [-2.60] [-2.59] [-3.93] [-3.86] [-4.47] [-0.63] 
roa 0.00286*** 0.00286*** 0.00296*** 0.00283*** 0.00314*** 0.00281*** 
 [5.18] [5.19] [5.37] [5.23] [5.94] [4.45] 
leverage 0.00002*** 0.00002*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00002*** 0.00003*** 
 [3.28] [3.28] [3.63] [3.69] [3.18] [3.35] 
payoutratio -0.00012** -0.00012** -0.00010* -0.00009 0.00009 0.00010 
 [-2.14] [-2.15] [-1.71] [-1.59] [1.60] [1.61] 
rdintensity 0.00229*** 0.00229*** 0.00229*** 0.00191*** 0.00079 0.00015 
 [3.17] [3.18] [3.17] [2.82] [1.12] [0.09] 
cashholdings -0.00121*** -0.00121*** -0.00057  -0.00048 -0.00179*** 
 [-3.38] [-3.38] [-1.59]  [-1.36] [-3.48] 
age_num   0.00003*** 0.00003*** -0.00002*** -0.00000 
   [8.44] [8.76] [-4.37] [-0.39] 
american   0.00004 0.00002 -0.00019*** -0.00009 
   [0.63] [0.36] [-3.01] [-1.03] 
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instage_num   0.00007*** 0.00007***   
   [12.35] [12.57]   
instamerican   0.00025*** 0.00025***   
   [3.76] [3.93]   
Year Fixed Effect No No No No Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect No No No No No Yes 
Constant -0.01846*** -0.01810*** -0.02633*** -0.02547*** -0.01775*** -0.01530*** 
 [-9.33] [-78.22] [-13.01] [-53.68] [-37.08] [-15.85] 
       
Observations 25,282 25,282 25,038 25,569 25,038 25,038 
Adjusted R-
squared 0 0 0 0 0 0 
t-statistics in 
brackets       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
Previous research in the banking industry by Saparito et al. (2013) find evidence that women 
are less likely to be trusted compared to their male peers. Since the bank is a major type of 
passive institutions, our results confirm that passive institutions have more confidence in male 
CEOs. People tend to underestimate women’s ability in male-typed domains because of the 
stereotype. The leadership - one of the most important characteristics of CEOs - is believed to 
be associated with men. Investors would not give female CEOs the same trust as they give to 
male CEOs and judge female CEOs’ performance more harshly. With respect to institutional 
investors holding huge shares of investee companies, when they target the investees, they need 
to consider investees’ management carefully. Then, the doubt about female CEOs’ leadership 
is highlighted, which makes male CEOs a preferred choice compared to female CEOs. Lee and 
James (2007) argue that investors respond negatively to the announcements of female CEOs. 
Our regression results are in line with what they conclude; however, it is in contrast to the 
conclusion of Francis et al. (2019). The controversy is because we investigate different groups 
of institutional investors.  
The differences between passive institutions’ and independent institutions’ business nature cre-
ate their varying preference for investees’ CEOs. Activist hedge funds get involved in investee 
firms’ business very closely. Thus, it is vital to enter agreements forcefully. Francis et al. (2019) 
state that female CEOs are usually willing to have private communication to reach settlements 
in a non-hostile way since hostile tactics could be very costly to investors as well as investees. 
More importantly, when a female CEO runs the investee firm, activist hedge funds could get 
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board seats and let their outside expertise become involved in investee firms’ management. 
Monitoring the composition of the board is an effective way to monitor the investee, so activists 
hedge funds can reach their stated goals successfully. We can conclude that female CEOs are 
more attractive to activist hedge funds, as well as other independent institutional investors. 
Female CEOs’ larger network size could benefit independent institutional investors’ business, 
and they are younger with shorter tenure that implies that female CEOs lack bargaining power 
for compensation. All those characteristics make female CEOs preferred target for independent 
institutional investors; however, in our case of passive institutions, the story could be relatively 
different.  
The passive institutions have different priorities compared to independent institutional inves-
tors. They put maintaining the existing and potential business relationships with investees as 
their first priority. In other words, monitoring the investee’s board by getting board seats or 
changing CEOs’ compensation structures is no longer attractive to them; these actions could 
even hurt their relationships with investees. Thus, passive institutions need to find reliable 
CEOs to lead investee firms to make sure they can bring profits to the investment and be open 
to business cooperation opportunities in the future. Based on male and female stereotypes, pas-
sive investors would see male CEOs as more suitable leaders to run the business and put trust 
in them. The advantages of female CEOs are less valuable under this circumstance because 
passive institutions do not need to monitor the operation of investee firms through them. To 
sum up, our negatively significant result is reasonable according to the business nature of pas-
sive institutions. 
As shown in Column 6, the coefficient of the instfemale indicator is negatively significant at 
5%. As instfemale is a dummy variable and equals 1 if a female CEO runs the institution, this 
result indicates that female CEOs usually invest smaller proportions of their portfolios in each 
firm. An institution with a female CEO would decrease the portfolio weight of each investee 
by 0.044%. This coefficient implies that women are risk-averse and less confident when in-
vesting. Our second hypothesis - institutions run by female CEOs are likely to invest less in a 
single investee - is proved. 
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For control variables, the coefficient of market value is positively significant at 1%, which 
implies that institutions are more likely to invest more of their portfolio weight to the firms 
with higher market value. A higher Tobin’s Q is a signal of stock overvaluing, which indicates 
a higher risk with the company. In the regression, the coefficients of Tobin’s Q are negative. 
This finding presents that institutions avoid investing in overvalued firms. As for another per-
formance measure, ROA, its coefficient is positively significant at 1%. This result implies that 
passive institutions are willing to put more weight of their portfolio into firms with better per-
formance. More interestingly, the coefficients of sales’ growth are negative, which shows that 
firms have strong sales’ growth would be less invested by passive institutions. It would be 
worth understanding passive institutions’ reasons for less valuing fast-growing companies.   
Bordalo et al. (2019) find that women are much less confident about themselves in male-typed 
domains. Investing requires mathematical and business skills. These two areas have been con-
sidered as domains where the male advantage is significant. Thus, not only men but also women 
themselves would underrate women’s ability when they invest. Meanwhile, male CEOs are 
likely to be overconfident about their investment decision, so they are willing to take risks. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) also show that managerial overconfidence could account for cor-
porate investment distortions. Regarding institutions’ huge shareholdings of S&P 500 compa-
nies, the difference in risk-taking between male and female CEOs is exaggerated. Female CEOs 
undertake safe strategies, for example, diversify their holdings to prevent market risk. In con-
trast, male CEOs choose to believe in their decisions and dare to invest more in an investee 
once they believe the investee will have excellent performance. In previous studies, we also 
notice that women are financially more risk-averse, and male executives undertake more ac-
quisitions and issue debt more often than female executives (Charness & Geezy, 2010; Huang 
& Kisgen, 2013). Our results empirically support that female CEOs prefer to diversify their 
investment to avoid risk.  
4.2 Gender diversity on board 
According to our main regression results, we conclude that the investee’s CEO gender does 
influence institutional investors when they invest. Earlier research has shown that gender 
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diversity has an impact on board inputs, and female board members could improve the effec-
tiveness of boards (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Then we start wondering if the gender diversity 
of the investee firm’s board would change institutional investors’ minds. 
To test gender diversity’s impact, we replace our female dummy variable with female-ratio,6 
which is the proportion of female directors at the annual report date selected. Then we run Tobit 
regression on the impact of female ratio on the portfolio weight of the investee firm. The results 
are reported in Table 4.2.  
 
6 Source: BoardEx. We calculate femaleratio based on the following equation: FemaleRatio = 1 – GenderRatio, which 
measures the proportion of male board members. 
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Table 4.2 Multivariate tobit regression on the impact of gender ratio on fraction of institu-
tions’ investments 
The sample includes all the passive institutions’ holding of S&P 500 companies. The dependent variable, portfo-
lio weight is measured by the institution’s holding of one company as a percentage of its total holding in that 
year. Independent variables are: femaleratio, the proportion of female directors at the annual report date se-
lected ; instfemale, the dummy variable instfemale equals to 1 if institution’s CEO is female. The control varia-
bles at the institution level are: num_invest, total number of the companies one institution invests in; total, Insti-
tution’s total investment amount. Control variables at the investee firms’ level: marketvalue, natural logarithm of 
market value; lnat, natural logarithm of total asset; tobinq, Tobin’s Q of investee firm; salegrowth, sales’ growth 
of investee firm; roa, ROA of investee firm; leverage, leverage of investee firm; payoutratio, pay out ratio of 
investee firm; rdintensity, research and development intensity of investee firm; cashholdings, cash holding of 
investee firm; invested, institutional ownership. The control variables at CEO level: age_num, age of investee 
firm’s CEO; american, nationality of investee firm’s CEO; instage_num, age of institution’s CEO; instamerican, 
nationality of institution’s CEO. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Portfolio 
Weight 
Portfolio 
Weigh 
Portfolio 
Weigh 
Portfolio 
Weigh 
Portfolio 
Weigh 
Portfolio 
Weigh 
              
femaleratio -0.00193*** -0.00193*** -0.00134*** -0.00129*** 0.000299 6.67e-05 
 [-6.62] [-6.62] [-4.54] [-4.44] (0.000293) (0.000410) 
instfemale -0.00112*** -0.00112*** -0.00067*** -0.00067*** -0.000382* -0.000451** 
 [-5.46] [-5.46] [-3.16] [-3.21] (0.000214) (0.000185) 
num_invest -0.00000  -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -2.66e-07*** -2.90e-07*** 
 [-0.22]  [-4.97] [-5.02] (3.12e-08) (2.69e-08) 
total -0.00000*** -0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0*** 0*** 
 [-4.41] [-7.98] [3.37] [3.39] (0) (0) 
invested 0.00023  0.00082    
 [0.12]  [0.42]    
marketvalue 0.00239*** 0.00239*** 0.00244*** 0.00241*** 0.00230*** 0.00184*** 
 [43.46] [43.58] [43.84] [43.93] (2.37e-05) (7.39e-05) 
lnat -0.00023*** -0.00023*** -0.00026*** -0.00023***   
 [-4.75] [-4.75] [-5.16] [-4.75]   
tobinq -0.00027*** -0.00027*** -0.00029*** -0.00028*** -0.000157*** -4.43e-05 
 [-7.35] [-7.35] [-7.83] [-7.69] (2.74e-05) (4.14e-05) 
salegrowth -0.00044*** -0.00044*** -0.00060*** -0.00058*** -0.000616*** -7.47e-05 
 [-3.07] [-3.07] [-4.22] [-4.12] (0.000143) (0.000136) 
roa 0.00276*** 0.00276*** 0.00290*** 0.00275*** 0.00296*** 0.00267*** 
 [5.01] [5.01] [5.27] [5.10] (0.000515) (0.000621) 
leverage 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 2.24e-05*** 2.47e-05*** 
 [3.49] [3.49] [3.75] [3.82] (7.17e-06) (7.58e-06) 
payoutratio -0.00008 -0.00008 -0.00007 -0.00006 9.13e-05* 0.000102* 
 [-1.43] [-1.43] [-1.26] [-1.16] (5.52e-05) (5.91e-05) 
rdintensity 0.00237*** 0.00237*** 0.00237*** 0.00194*** 0.000440 0.000201 
 [3.29] [3.29] [3.30] [2.86] (0.000667) (0.00173) 
cashholdings -0.00132*** -0.00132*** -0.00067*    
 [-3.68] [-3.67] [-1.86]    
age_num   0.00003*** 0.00003*** -1.72e-05*** -1.18e-06 
   [8.13] [8.52] (4.08e-06) (5.01e-06) 
american   0.00006 0.00004 -0.000215*** -8.29e-05 
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   [0.90] [0.59] (6.25e-05) (8.33e-05) 
instage_num   0.00007*** 0.00007***   
   [12.17] [12.42]   
instamerican   0.00024*** 0.00025***   
   [3.69] [3.87]   
Year Fixed Effect No No No No Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effect No No No No No Yes 
Constant -0.01832*** -0.01811*** -0.02608*** -0.02534*** -0.0177*** -0.0159*** 
 [-9.27] [-78.31] [-12.88] [-53.27] (0.000467) (0.000931) 
       
Observations 25,282 25,282 25,038 25,569 25,569 25,569 
Adjusted R-
squared 0 0 0 0     
t-statistics in 
brackets       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
 
Using the control variables from investee firms’ and CEOs’ characteristics, we also control the 
year fixed effect to exclude the macro-economic factors’ effect. The regression result is shown 
in Column 6. The coefficient of the femaleratio is positive but not significant. This coefficient 
indicates that the proportion of female directors on the board does not influence passive insti-
tutions when they invest. One of the reasons behind this phenomenon might be that gender 
diversity in the board room does not affect the firm’s risk-taking. From the study by Sila et al. 
(2010), they claim that female boardroom representation would not influence equity risk. 
Therefore, passive institutions might not pay attention to the gender diversity of investees’ 
boards.  
Furthermore, based on the U.S. market, gender diversity in board rooms remains low. The per-
centage of board seats held by women was 16% in 2008 and 22% in 2017.7 In theory, with the 
increase of gender diversity, the firms would face problems like taking more time and effort to 
make an agreement. As a consequence, investors do not need to start worrying about the side 
products of gender diversity. 
Compared to our main regression result, gender diversity on boards is not as important as the 
CEO gender for the passive institution. Clearly, the CEO is one of the most powerful positions 
in the firm. Since institutional investors usually hold vast stakes of the investee firms, they need 
 
7 Source: ISS Analytics 
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to work with the investee firms’ CEOs. It is reasonable for institutional investors to show their 
preference for different genders CEOs. Nevertheless, gender diversity would not be as signifi-
cant as the gender of the CEO. Specifically, passive institutions are less willing to monitor 
investee firms. They do not need to monitor the investee firms’ board composition. Our regres-
sion results empirically prove that passive institutions would not take gender diversity of in-
vestee firms’ boards into account. 
As shown in Column 6, the other key explanatory variable, instfemale, its coefficient is nega-
tively significant at 5%. Our second hypothesis is proved. The firm-level control variables, 
such as market value, Tobin’s Q, sale’s growth and ROA, hold the same results as the main 
regression results.  
4.3 Robustness test 
In our robustness test, we first considered to separate our data into two periods, pre-2008 and 
past-2008. Similar to our main regression, we test H1 and H2 using the Tobit regression method 
with the same group of control variables. Table 4.3 shows the regression results based on the 
date from 2001 to 2007.  
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Table 4.3 Multivariate tobit regression on the impact of gender on fraction of institutions’ in-
vestments before 2008 
The sample includes all the passive institutions’ holding of S&P 500 companies from 2001 to 2007. The depend-
ent variable, portfolio weight is measured by the institution’s holding of one company as a percentage of its total 
holding in that year. Independent variables are female and instfemale. The dummy variable female equals to 1 if 
target firm’s CEO is female; the dummy variable instfemale equals to 1 if institution’s CEO is female. The con-
trol variables at the institution level are: num_invest, total number of the companies one institution invests in; 
total, Institution’s total invest-ment amount. Control variables at the investee firms’ level: marketvalue, natural 
logarithm of market value; lnat, natural logarithm of total asset; tobinq, Tobin’s Q of investee firm; salegrowth, 
sales’ growth of investee firm; roa, ROA of investee firm; leverage, leverage of investee firm; payoutratio, pay 
out ratio of investee firm; rdin-tensity, research and development intensity of investee firm; cashholdings, cash 
holding of investee firm; invested, institutional ownership. The control variables at CEO level: age_num, age of 
investee firm’s CEO; american, nationality of investee firm’s CEO; instage_num, age of institution’s CEO; in-
stamerican, nationality of institution’s CEO. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Portfolio weight Portfolio weight Portfolio weight Portfolio weight Portfolio weight 
            
female -0.00108** -0.00109** -0.00104** -0.00102** -0.00097** 
 [-2.55] [-2.57] [-2.44] [-2.43] [-2.30] 
instfemale -0.00105 -0.00116 -0.00110 -0.00119 -0.00077 
 [-1.36] [-1.51] [-1.41] [-1.55] [-1.01] 
num_invest -0.00000***  -0.00000* -0.00000* -0.00000*** 
 [-2.58]  [-1.90] [-1.76] [-3.75] 
total 0.00000 -0.00000** 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000*** 
 [0.92] [-2.06] [0.30] [0.18] [3.24] 
invested 0.00067  0.00076   
 [0.30]  [0.34]   
marketvalue 0.00250*** 0.00242*** 0.00251*** 0.00240*** 0.00248*** 
 [22.90] [57.94] [23.00] [57.50] [58.17] 
lnat -0.00010  -0.00010   
 [-0.96]  [-1.01]   
tobinq -0.00003 0.00001 -0.00004 0.00001 -0.00012** 
 [-0.39] [0.25] [-0.55] [0.24] [-2.33] 
salegrowth -0.00094*** -0.00095*** -0.00094*** -0.00095*** -0.00065*** 
 [-4.23] [-4.30] [-4.21] [-4.39] [-2.93] 
roa -0.00059 -0.00028 -0.00059 -0.00033 0.00152* 
 [-0.63] [-0.31] [-0.63] [-0.38] [1.68] 
leverage 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 
 [1.50] [1.29] [1.54] [1.35] [1.62] 
payoutratio -0.00010 -0.00010 -0.00009 -0.00009 0.00015 
 [-1.03] [-0.98] [-0.87] [-0.94] [1.49] 
rdintensity 0.00145 0.00163 0.00126 0.00141 0.00140 
 [1.07] [1.21] [0.92] [1.09] [1.04] 
cashholdings -0.00003 0.00006 0.00013  0.00051 
 [-0.05] [0.08] [0.19]  [0.74] 
age_num   0.00001 0.00001 -0.00002*** 
   [1.07] [1.12] [-2.60] 
american   -0.00019 -0.00021 -0.00032** 
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   [-1.29] [-1.48] [-2.21] 
instage_num   0.00003** 0.00003**  
   [2.52] [2.57]  
instamerican   -0.00017 -0.00016  
   [-1.21] [-1.16]  
Year Fixed Effect No No No No Yes 
Constant -0.02087*** -0.02067*** -0.02364*** -0.02291*** -0.01926*** 
 [-9.19] [-52.00] [-9.42] [-21.31] [-24.91] 
Observations 9,621 9,621 9,604 9,794 9,604 
Adjusted R-squared 0 0 0 0 0 
t-statistics in brackets      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
As shown in Column 5, after controlling for the year fixed effect, the coefficient of the female 
dummy is negatively significant at 1%. This result indicates that firms with female CEOs are 
less invested compared to the firms with make CEOs. Our first hypothesis, passive institutions 
regard male CEOs as preferred targets, is proved. Although we get the same conclusion of H1 
based on the pre-2008 data, the regression result does not support the second hypothesis. We 
use the instfemale dummy to test our second hypothesis. From Column 5, the coefficient of the 
instfemale dummy is negative but not significant. This result implies that differences between 
male and female institutions’ CEOs would not have any impact when they make an investment 
decision. The female CEO is an exception in the U.S., especially in earlier years. Besides, the 
passive institutions, including banks and insurance firms, which are both traditionally male-
typed domains. In addition, we have few institutions that were led by female CEOs before 2008. 
These facts lead to an insignificant regression result for the second hypothesis. 
Then we run the regression using data from 2008 to 2017. The results are shown in Table 4.4. 
After controlling for the year fixed effect, the regression result is listed in Column 5. The co-
efficient of the female dummy is negatively significant at 1%. Having a female CEO would 
decrease the investee firm’s weight in the institution’s portfolio by 0.052%. We confirm that 
passive institution prefers investee firms that have male CEOs. Regarding the second hypoth-
esis, we find that the coefficient of the instfemale dummy is negatively significant at 10%. Thus, 
an institution with a female CEO would decrease the portfolio weight of each investee by 
0.035%. Again, we prove the second hypothesis. Based on the data from 2008 to 2017, we 
obtain the same results as the results have been shown in the main regression Table 4.1, both 
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of our H1 and H2 are proved. 
 
Table 4.4 Multivariate tobit regression on the impact of gender on fraction of institutions’ in-
vestments after 2008 
The sample includes all the passive institutions’ holding of S&P 500 companies from 2008 to 2017. The dependent 
variable, portfolio weight is measured by the institution’s holding of one company as a percentage of its total 
holding in that year. Independent variables are female and instfemale. The dummy variable female equals to 1 if 
target firm’s CEO is female; the dummy variable instfemale equals to 1 if institution’s CEO is female. The control 
variables at the institution level are: num_invest, total number of the companies one institution invests in; total, 
Institution’s total investment amount. Control variables at the investee firms’ level: marketvalue, natural logarithm 
of market value; lnat, natural logarithm of total asset; tobinq, Tobin’s Q of investee firm; salegrowth, sales’ growth 
of investee firm; roa, ROA of investee firm; leverage, leverage of investee firm; payoutratio, pay out ratio of 
investee firm; rdintensity, research and development intensity of investee firm; cashholdings, cash holding of 
investee firm; invested, institutional ownership. The control variables at CEO level: age_num, age of investee 
firm’s CEO; american, nationality of investee firm’s CEO; instage_num, age of institution’s CEO; instamerican, 
nationality of institution’s CEO. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
portfolio-
weight 
portfolio-
weight 
portfolio-
weight 
portfolio-
weight 
portfolio-
weight 
            
female -0.00066*** -0.00065*** -0.00065*** -0.00072*** -0.00056*** 
 [-3.95] [-3.89] [-3.87] [-4.43] [-3.40] 
instfemale -0.00090*** -0.00093*** -0.00058*** -0.00066*** -0.00035* 
 [-4.71] [-4.90] [-2.87] [-3.34] [-1.71] 
num_invest -0.00000*  -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -0.00000*** 
 [-1.65]  [-4.44] [-4.52] [-8.77] 
total -0.00000 -0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 
 [-1.37] [-5.04] [4.02] [4.05] [6.85] 
marketvalue 0.00217*** 0.00203*** 0.00226*** 0.00203*** 0.00219*** 
 [35.50] [74.45] [36.07] [75.01] [78.03] 
lnat -0.00015***  -0.00024***   
 [-2.80]  [-4.14]   
tobinq -0.00044*** -0.00036*** -0.00045*** -0.00034*** -0.00020*** 
 [-10.64] [-11.57] [-10.77] [-10.90] [-6.27] 
salegrowth -0.00045** -0.00045** -0.00051*** -0.00048** -0.00062*** 
 [-2.37] [-2.40] [-2.71] [-2.55] [-3.12] 
roa 0.00750*** 0.00818*** 0.00691*** 0.00758*** 0.00495*** 
 [10.73] [12.63] [9.82] [12.13] [7.57] 
leverage 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 
 [3.14] [2.83] [3.35] [2.98] [3.21] 
payoutratio -0.00007 -0.00006 -0.00009 -0.00007 0.00007 
 [-1.12] [-0.92] [-1.33] [-1.10] [1.01] 
rdintensity 0.00252*** 0.00254*** 0.00236*** 0.00192** 0.00046 
 [3.12] [3.15] [2.91] [2.52] [0.58] 
cashholdings -0.00109*** -0.00098** -0.00096**  -0.00117*** 
 [-2.69] [-2.44] [-2.37]  [-2.94] 
age_num   0.00002*** 0.00002*** -0.00002*** 
   [4.43] [4.13] [-3.51] 
american   0.00003 -0.00001 -0.00013** 
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   [0.38] [-0.09] [-2.03] 
instage_num   0.00006*** 0.00006***  
   [8.67] [8.46]  
instamerican   0.00022*** 0.00021***  
   [3.03] [2.99]  
Year Fixed Effect No No No No Yes 
Constant -0.01743*** -0.01780*** -0.02291*** -0.02299*** -0.01643*** 
 [-59.58] [-66.67] [-36.94] [-37.99] [-38.97] 
Observations 15,661 15,661 15,434 15,775 15,434 
Adjusted R-squared 0 0 0 0 0 
t-statistics in brackets      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
We could find several highlights through the comparison of the regression results from these 
two periods. Comparing the results in Column 5 from Table 4.3 to that from Table 4.4, the 
coefficient of the female indicator increases from -0.097% to -0.056%. Since the coefficient 
here represents the difference in change of the dependent variable- portfolio weight, this result 
indicates that the differences between portfolio weights of investee firms run by different gen-
ders’ CEOs are getting smaller. Although in both of the periods we find that passive institutions 
regard male CEOs as preferred targets, passive institutions are becoming less discriminating 
against the female CEOs. Men occupied top executive positions first and still take the majority 
of this kind of position. People would assume that men are more qualified than women and 
have more characteristics associated with leadership (Shenhav, 1992). In the earlier years, the 
investors did react more negatively to female directors than they did recently. Since the begin-
ning of this century, large publicly traded companies have taken actions to improve the gender 
diversity on their board, companied by the legislation on equal gender representation in the 
company, more and more female CEOs appear. This allowed institutional investors to work 
with investee firms run by women and learn more about the new female business leaders. The 
market previously rejected female CEOs because of the persisted gender stereotype. Further-
more, the practice of involving more female representatives changes the attitude of the passive 
institution when they make investment decisions. 
  
45 
 
 
Table 4.5 Multivariate Tobit regression on the impact of gender on fraction of institutions’ invest-
ments (Insurance company) 
The sample includes all the passive institutions’ holding of S&P 500 companies. The dependent variable, portfo-
lio weight is measured by the institution’s holding of one company as a percentage of its total holding in that 
year. Independent variables are: female, the dummy variable female equals to 1 if S&P firm’s CEO is female.; 
instfemale, the dummy variable instfemale equals to 1 if institution’s CEO is female. The control variables at the 
institution level are: num_invest, total number of the companies one institution invests in; total, Institution’s to-
tal investment amount. Control variables at the investee firms’ level: marketvalue, natural logarithm of market 
value; lnat, natural logarithm of total asset; tobinq, Tobin’s Q of investee firm; salegrowth, sales’ growth of in-
vestee firm; roa, ROA of investee firm; leverage, leverage of investee firm; payoutratio, pay out ratio of investee 
firm; rdintensity, research and development intensity of investee firm; cashholdings, cash holding of investee 
firm; invested, institutional ownership. The control variables at CEO level: age_num, age of investee firm’s 
CEO; american, nationality of investee firm’s CEO; instage_num, age of institution’s CEO; instamerican, na-
tionality of institution’s CEO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Portfolio 
Weight 
Portfolio 
Weight 
Portfolio 
Weight 
Portfolio 
Weight 
Portfolio 
Weight 
            
female -0.00030* -0.00030* -0.00031* -0.00032** -0.00031* 
 [-1.83] [-1.83] [-1.86] [-1.98] [-1.87] 
instfemale 0.00060*** 0.00062*** -0.00037 -0.00037 0.00025 
 [4.20] [4.33] [-0.74] [-0.75] [0.55] 
num_invest -0.00000**  -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -0.00000 
 [-2.03]  [-2.83] [-2.83] [-1.38] 
total -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -0.00000 
 [-14.84] [-17.02] [-14.35] [-14.50] [-0.34] 
invested 0.00068  0.00063   
 [0.42]  [0.39]   
marketvalue 0.00141*** 0.00140*** 0.00142*** 0.00141*** 0.00154*** 
 [25.60] [25.56] [25.62] [25.78] [65.12] 
lnat 0.00011** 0.00011** 0.00010** 0.00010*  
 [2.18] [2.19] [2.01] [1.96]  
tobinq -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00004 -0.00003 -0.00012*** 
 [-0.79] [-0.67] [-0.97] [-0.75] [-4.32] 
salegrowth -0.00048*** -0.00045*** -0.00044*** -0.00044*** -0.00032** 
 [-3.42] [-3.18] [-3.10] [-3.14] [-2.25] 
roa 0.00095* 0.00091* 0.00102** 0.00103** 0.00125** 
 [1.90] [1.81] [2.02] [2.08] [2.56] 
leverage 0.00002** 0.00002** 0.00002** 0.00002** 0.00002*** 
 [2.12] [2.16] [2.07] [2.09] [2.65] 
payoutratio -0.00020*** -0.00019*** -0.00020*** -0.00019*** -0.00015*** 
 [-3.67] [-3.47] [-3.61] [-3.43] [-2.65] 
rdintensity 0.00071 0.00074 0.00060 0.00075 0.00059 
 [1.02] [1.06] [0.86] [1.14] [0.85] 
cashholdings 0.00037 0.00029 0.00036  0.00032 
 [1.07] [0.85] [1.05]  [0.93] 
age_num   -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00001 
   [-0.07] [-0.05] [-1.38] 
american   -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00003 
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   [-0.66] [-0.68] [-0.46] 
instage_num   -0.00005*** -0.00005***  
   [-4.68] [-4.77]  
instamerican   -0.00073 -0.00073  
   [-1.47] [-1.47]  
Year Fixed Effect No No No No Yes 
Constant -0.01210*** -0.01217*** -0.00743*** -0.00669*** -0.00305 
 [-7.23] [-54.33] [-3.78] [-6.15] [-0.54] 
      
Observations 4,489 4,489 4,445 4,541 4,445 
Adjusted R-squared 0 0 0 0 0 
t-statistics in brackets      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
Lastly, we run the regression using data of insurance companies’ holdings from 2001 to 2017. 
The results are shown in Table 4.5. After controlling for the year fixed effect, the regression 
result is listed in Column 5. The coefficient of the female dummy is negatively significant at 
10%. Having a female CEO would decrease the investee firm’s weight in the institution’s port-
folio by 0.031%. We confirm that passive institution prefers investee firms that have male 
CEOs. But the regression result does not support the second hypothesis. We use the instfemale 
dummy to test our second hypothesis. From Column 5, the coefficient of the instfemale indi-
cator is not significant. One possible explanation is the number of female-led insurance com-
pany is too small to get significant result.  
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5. Conclusion 
Based on the institutional ownership data of U.S. S&P 500 companies from 2001 to 2017, this 
project investigates whether investee firms’ CEOs’ gender impact passive institutions invest-
ment decisions. There is evidence that passive institutions invest greater proportions of their 
portfolios in firms with male CEOs compared to those with female CEOs. This evidence im-
plies that passive institutions regard male CEOs as preferred targets. This research is the first 
to investigate passive institutions’ preference for CEO’s genders. Thus, the research introduces 
new understanding of passive institutions. The results indicate that the passive institutions with 
female CEOs invest smaller proportions of their portfolios in each firm. This finding illustrates 
a systematic bias against investing in female led firms. 
With the trend that more companies increase their gender diversity on their board, we also test 
if investee firms’ gender diversity on their board influences passive institutions’ choice. There 
is no evidence that the fraction of female board members affects the portfolio weights, so the 
result applies strictly to female leadership, and not to female representation. Passive institutions 
are less willing to monitor investee firms compared to independent institutional investors so 
that they would pay less attention to the investee firms’ board composition.  
Comparing the regression results from two periods, pre-2008 and past-2008, the results show 
that passive institutions are becoming less resistant to female CEOs. With more female CEOs 
appearing in the finance industry in recent years, passive institutions’ attitude towards female 
CEOs is changing.  
This research has some limitations as it is hard to control for the fundamental differences of 
the passive institutions. The differences among these institutions might cause their different 
investment decisions; however, this effect can not be excluded in this paper. As for further 
research, firstly, the investee firm’s sample should be expanded to S&P 1500 listing firms, 
which could provide broader coverage of the U.S. stock market. Secondly, it is worth investi-
gating whether and how transitions from male to female CEOs impact institutional investors 
when they invest. 
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This research was designed to contribute to the following areas. First, this paper enriches the 
understanding of institutional investors. The results suggest that passive institutions regard 
male CEOs as preferred targets. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that people 
tend to underestimate women's ability in male-typed domains because of stereotypes. Next, 
these findings can help institutions know the varying needs of different types of institutional 
investors, while providing investors with a deeper understanding of female CEOs as well as 
supporting new regulations with a theoretical background. Last but not least, the results con-
firm that female CEOs are more risk-averse compared to their male peers.  
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